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This article shows how motorcycle taxi drivers in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 
deal with labour insecurity, tighter competition, minimum social welfare, de-
drivers employ diverse strategies to obtain more orders and therefore also 
more income. Drivers use prohibited mobile application-based technologies, 
which resemble those of their platforms, as well as non-technological strat-
egies to boost their account’s performance. The article argues that whereas 
these prohibited practices can be understood as ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott 
1985), as oppositional acts against the holders of power and capital, they are 
also pragmatic survival tactics. Furthermore, the article shows that although 
the drivers’ resistance is about individual acts, their knowledge and strategies 
are sourced and shared collectively through social media platforms. Being 
widely distributed between drivers and commonly applied by drivers, these 
strategies have nonetheless not been able to transform driver-company rela-
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The world economy has become increasingly coordinated and integrat-
ed into a ‘platform capitalism’ that operates within the digital economy 
(Srnicek 2017). In this context, the word ‘platform’ refers to companies 
that convey customers’ demands to ‘independent contractors’ (or ‘part-
ners’) through mobile phone applications (apps), which positions the 
contractors with minimum workers’ rights. These contractors serve as 
This article can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v39i1.6175.
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micro-entrepreneurs and suppliers, capitalising their assets (including 
motorcycles, cars, homes, etc.) to earn extra income, although many of 
them depend on the platform as the main source of income. In Southeast 
-
cantly to economic growth. Bloomberg reports that Indonesia has been 
the region’s largest contributor to the growth of the internet economy, 
is predicted to triple by 2025 (Wagner and Lee 2020).
One prominent platform company in Indonesia is the motorcycle taxi 
jackets.1
(popularly known as Gojek). It has become the most popular platform 
company in Indonesia. Apart from motorcycle taxies, which is the most 
popular service, Gojek provides more than twenty types of services to 
and motorcycle, Go-Ride), food delivery (Go-Food), house cleaning (Go-
Clean), courier services (Go-Send), online shopping (Go-Mart and Go-
Shop) and e-money (Go-Pay). One study found that Gojek contributed 
USD 87 billion to Indonesia’s economy in 2019, with a multiplier effect 
of USD 17.5 billion. This amount was equivalent to one per cent of Indo-
nesia’s total domestic growth (Fitri 2020). The company has expanded 
its operations to other Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, 
the Philippines and Thailand. Gojek became a Decacorn company in 
2019, with a total investment of USD 100 billion (Wagner and Lee 2020). 
Its application on the Google Playstore has been downloaded 15 million 
times, which is an indication of the high valuation of the company. Its 
founder, Nadiem Anwar Makarim, currently serves as Minister of Edu-
cation in President Joko Widodo’s cabinet.
While we see a growing and successful platform economy, exempli-
-
tion of studies into the social and political aspects of workers in the dig-
ital economy, including app-based online transportation drivers. Ma-
lin and Chandler (2017) unfold the ‘splintering precarity’ of app-based 
workers that leads to ‘a feeling of insecurity and instability in regard 
to work’ (2017: 384). Hua and Ray (2018) explore the social hierarchy 
between the full-time Uber drivers, who are mostly male immigrants, 
and the part-time drivers. Kumar et al. (2018) argue that app-based 
companies, such as Uber, have reinforced the existing modes of op-
pression in the Global South, such as Bangladesh, through the politics 
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of algorithm. Here, algorithm refers to ‘encoded procedures for trans-
-
tions’ (Bellanova 2017: 330). In app-based companies, an algorithm is 
a way to distribute service orders among the company’s partners (i.e. 
the drivers) based on a combination of factors that include drivers’ 
performance. The data owner, i.e. the company, has the power to de-
words, the politics of algorithm is a form of power that emerges from 
a system controlled solely by the company, and that determines the 
working life of the drivers, including who will get orders and who will 
not. Here, power circulates and is exercised through the design and 
use of devices (Latour 1986 in Bellanova 2017: 330). Such online trans-
portation service systems have, of course, impacted workers (Ford and 
Honan 2017, Nastiti 2017) and the urban poor population (Peters 2020). 
vulnerability, and Aulia Nastiti (2017) argues that app-based compa-
nies have been ‘super exploitative’ towards drivers through their al-
this situation with a series of short-lived protests between 2017-2018 in 
several big cities in Indonesia.2
This article explores the increased insecurity of ride-hailing mo-
torcycle taxi drivers in Yogyakarta and their everyday resistance to-
wards the company that exploits them. We present the main strategies 
that these drivers employ, which include technological means (using 
a hacked application technology system and ‘account therapy’) and 
non-technological means (having or commercialising a ‘joki account’). 
Our investigation shows that drivers persistently exercise these forms 
of individual, small-scale resistance even though they are prohibited 
by the platform company, and despite the threat of suspension (viola-
tions are often quickly detected). 
Yogyakarta, the location of this study, is situated in the south- 
central part of Java. It is popularly known as a ‘city of students’ (host-
ing about 120 higher education institutions with more than 350,000 stu-
dents) and a ‘city of culture’ (being Indonesia’s second-most popular 
tourist destination). Gojek began offering its services in Yogyakarta in 
2015, and by 2018 it had 200 drivers in the city. The number of drivers 
million trips per day (Kusumo 2019). Gojek’s impact on Yogyakarta’s 
economy is substantial, contributing IDR 2.5 trillion (USD 178.8 million) 
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to the local economy in 2018 (Walandouw et al. 2018). We have con-
and July and August 2020. Data was collected through in-depth inter-
views and focus-group discussions with drivers, and also participant 
observation and conversing with drivers while using Go-Ride services 
(before the COVID-19 pandemic). One of the researchers, Mustika, also 
joined an open group on the social media platform Telegram, which 
included Gojek drivers from around Indonesia. In the following, we 
-
tutional void, the platform economy has impacted workers. Then we 
by Gojek drivers. In conclusion, we will discuss the impact that driv-
ers’ everyday resistance has on the platform economy. 
Platform Capitalism and Institutional Voids
Some scholars have viewed the platform economy, also dubbed the 
on gigworkers or ‘crowdworkers’ (Fuchs 2014). Many experts, partic-
grants workers autonomy in determining what they do, when, where 
and how they do their work (Scholz 2016: 52;  Sundararajan 2016). Plat-
form companies, meanwhile, connect customers with service provid-
and clerical work (Friedman 2014: 171). The companies create mobile 
application systems to link providers and customers, and they set the 
ground rules, mechanisms and sanctions that regulate partner oper-
ations (such as cost per kilometre, available bonuses, etc.). They also 
own and control the data on all transactions and can capitalise data for 
their own interests. As will be clear in this article, power is exercised 
asymmetrically through the algorithms created by platform compa-
nies (Curchod et al. 2020). 
The service providers are not employees as such, but ‘independent 
contractors’ or ‘partners’ (mitra), which means that companies are 
exempt from providing workers’ welfare and rights like health in-
surance, employment insurance, paid holiday, pension and so forth 
(Schmidt 2017). The absence of social protection and the deterioration 
of workers’ rights are the main reasons why many scholars are critical 
of the platform economy. They argue that, as platforms shift risks and 
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costs—including human resources and healthcare (ibid.) to service pro-
viders—these contractors face increased vulnerability, unpredictable in-
come and welfare insecurity (Hewison and Kalleberg 2012: 2; Schmidt 
2017: 3;  Prassl and Risak 2017). Ultimately, this may exacerbate econom-
ic inequality and threaten the foundation of the middle class (Tucker 
2018;  Hill 2015). Guy Standing (2011: 6) even suggests that this situa-
middle-class people were supposed to possess’. Clearly, the platform 
economy is part of the capitalist system, as its infrastructure is privately 
Moreover, we argue that the platform economy in Indonesia op-
erates in an institutional void, which has detrimental effects on the 
drivers. Formal institutions, such as governments, play a major role in 
market regulation and operations (North 1999), and importantly, gov-
ernments provide policy frameworks that ensure business certainty in 
market activities. When the government fails to do so, there is an ‘in-
stitutional void’, i.e. the absence or shortcoming of formal institutions. 
In the context where platform economies are burgeoning, institutional 
voids may promote de-institutionalisation by bypassing or undermin-
ing formal government rules and regulations under the pretext of eco-
nomic growth (Heeks et al. 2020). 
In Indonesia, where online workers are practically microenterprises 
operating in an informal sector, the existing law on manpower can-
not be used to regulate the platform economy. The former Indonesian 
Minister of Labour, Hanif Dhakiri, explained this in an interview with 
the Indonesian online newspaper Tempo, saying they are not entitled 
to the workers’ rights established and regulated in Articles 99 and 
100 of the 2013 Labour Law (Sianipar 2015). Instead, they are covered 
Perjanjian 
Kerja Waktu Tertentu Perjanji-
an Kerja Waktu Tidak Tertentu) that are ministerial regulations with a 
lower standing than laws. Unlike workers in the formal sector, Gojek’s 
drivers do not have a union, and this is regulated by law. They have 
a paguyuban, an informal community with very modest aims, such as 
providing a forum for communication where drivers share their ex-
periences, tips and tricks, rather than acting as a political formation 
advocating for its members’ interests. Despite this void, President Joko 
Widodo has supported the platform economy and digital business in 
general, encouraging and facilitating the establishment of new start-up 
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Digital Initiative programme to boost this sector. One of the reasons 
that the President supports the platform economy is that the sector 
helps decrease the rate of unemployment in Indonesia; the platform 
economy involves 2.5 million Indonesians (Wagner and Lee 2020).
Company Policies
-
uation by attracting as many drivers and customers as possible. It of-
fered large bonuses and good pay that was two or three times the local 
minimum wage standard (Nastiti 2017). After experiencing a steady 
-
pany has recruited more drivers, increased the competition among 
-
ening the requirements for drivers to get bonuses. The position of Go-
jek’s drivers has become increasingly vulnerable. 
In addition to decreasing the drivers’ access to tariffs and bonuses, 
the company has become a broker for social rights rather than pro-
viding them. One example is insurance: Gojek has provided drivers 
with the means to voluntarily purchase insurance products through 
their mobile applications, with payment deducted from their Go-Pay 
bought an insurance product for his wife and three children with the 
transaction facilitated by Gojek, meaning that the cost of the family 
insurance was deducted from his Go-Pay account every day, and it 
was up to the driver to secure his insurance rights. The company also 
facilitated other saving schemes for drivers and used Go-Pay to control 
the circulation of the money. 
an algorithmic management tool that allows platform providers to re-
ward the behaviour of its drivers by awarding virtual credit points 
and by ranking their performance (Schmidt 2017: 12). Credit points 
and ranking has become a foundation for the categorisation of each 
driver into a class that determines whether they will easily pick orders 
or not. A poorly ranked driver will thus receive fewer orders than a 
driver that is ranked higher, as we discuss below.  Customers play 
provided, drivers receive a customer evaluation in the form of stars. 
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results are recorded in the app providing a basis upon which drivers’ 
performance is reviewed, often without the opportunity for drivers to 
they include the politeness and timeliness of the drivers. If drivers de-
minutes; and if drivers refuse two orders within one hour, their ac-
counts will be suspended for the next thirty minutes (Nastiti 2017: 23). 
‘Accounts’ here refer to the ID of the driver, with which one can log in 
and operate as drivers. Once an account is downgraded or suspended, 
a driver cannot access the account and cannot work to earn money. 
The company uses this rating system together with a point system. 
Points are based on the types of services provided by drivers: one point 
for a ride, two points for food delivery and three points for courier ser-
vices. When drivers achieve a certain number of points set by the compa-
ny, they are eligible for bonuses. As the tariff per kilometre has dropped, 
drivers have increasingly relied on these bonuses. This is what we can 
Drivers have no access to either data or the customers’ evaluations. The 
based on an algorithm and readily manipulated due to customers’ eval-
uation and the company’s awards and punishments. Nevertheless, as 
we shall learn in the following, drivers have found ways to resist.   
-
ible platform economy, particularly the lack of welfare rights, workers 
have exercised different forms of resistance, such as strikes and street 
demonstrations. In the context of the United States and Europe, many 
lawsuits and litigation cases have emerged to determine gigworkers’ 
legal status (Schmidt 2017: 21). Similarly, gigworkers have begun to es-
tablish unions in the US. In countries with weak systems for enforcing 
and protecting legal rights, such as Indonesia, protests against com-
panies’ bonus and tariff rate policies have not yielded any substantial 
changes (Nastiti 2017). In such precarious settings, gigworkers can ap-
ply what James Scott (1985: 28) calls ‘everyday resistance’:
Here I have in mind the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless 
groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned 
ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth. These Brechtian forms 
of class struggle have certain features in common. They require little or 
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no coordination or planning; they often represent a form of individual 
self-help; and they typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation 
with authority or with elite norms. 
The forms of resistance applied by Gojek drivers differ from those ap-
plied by Scott’s farmers in Malaysia. They include technological means 
(using a hacked application technology system or ‘account therapy’) 
and non-technological means (having or commercialising a ‘joki ac-
count’). We identify these strategies as ‘everyday resistance’ because 
they involve the mundane use of everyday tactics (i.e. the applications 
used by drivers in their everyday work) to assert their interests. Driv-
in an increasingly competitive market. Apart from being a means to 
secure survival, they also constitute an oppositional act against power 
holders—although it is a small-scale and only a short-term resistance 
against the increasingly exploitive patterns of the platform company. 
This app-based resistance is not spectacular, but an ordinary part of 
drivers’ daily life. 
Whereas inspirational studies have not situated resistance in the con-
text of platform economy and the use of app-based technology (Tria 
Kerkvliet 2009; Mannell 2017; Scott 1985), they provide useful insights 
on how resistance operates. For instance, Kate Mannell (2017) explores 
resistance through text messages. Mannell (2017: 46) argues that the 
act of limiting and rejecting particular technology’, hence positioning 
the subject (people) and technology as opposing positions, rather than 
it. This is a more productive position and one that we have chosen to 
apply in our own study. 
 Let us now turn to the everyday resistance by Gojek drivers. Their 
strategies are essentially different ways to work around their accounts 
through technological means (using a hacked application technology 
system, i.e. ‘ghost account’, and ‘account therapy’) and non-technological 
means (having a duplicate account or commercialising a ‘joki account’). 
As mentioned above, the term ‘account’ refers to the ID of a driver. Driv-
ers use their ID to log in to the company system to pick orders. The driv-
ers whom we interviewed distinguish between three types of accounts 
according to how an account is experienced by a driver. An account can 
shift categories by being upgraded or downgraded according to the al-
gorithm of the company that relies on customer ratings and the drivers’ 
performance history, such as acceptance and rejection of orders. The 
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gacor 
account—gacor being an abbreviation of gampang cari order, 
orders’. This kind of account easily picks up orders, and the waiting 
time between orders is short. To be upgraded to a gacor account, driv-
ers must pick up every order coming to the app—even if they are far 
away from the location, which usually drivers are reluctant to respond 
to. In this way, drivers can boost their account performance calculated 
by the company system. The second category is anyep (meaning ‘cold’), 
an account that receives orders less frequently; the third is gagu (‘silent’ 
or ‘mute’ in Javanese), which rarely receives orders. Accounts become 
‘cold’ or ‘silent’ because of the drivers’ performance (e.g. they are too 
picky) or if their mobile phone is old and has limited memory, which 
makes it hard to pick up orders in the system.  
It is the company that operates the algorithmic management. One 
driver explained that he was uncertain why his account was anyep at 
one time and gacor at another time, even though his performance was 
the same – he received good ratings from customers and never rejected 
orders. Likewise, another driver reported that her account had always 
been gacor, but after the COVID-19 pandemic, her account became any-
ep, receiving few orders for no apparent reason. She guessed that the 
company prioritised male over female drivers during the pandemic. As 
these examples show, the algorithm’s sorting of the drivers’ accounts 
into categories occur without the drivers’ knowledge and understand-
ing. This sorting was a source of frustration for the drivers because it 
their prospects of generating an income. Everyday resistance is used by 
drivers to deal with the increasingly exploitative system, tighter com-
petition and reduced income that this algorithm organises. It does not 
mean that drivers always apply strategies with the intention to resist,3 
yet we argue that the perspective of everyday resistance is productive 
in that we focus on drivers who individually attempted to increase their 
revenue at a time when the company had started to rationalise the tariff 
per kilometres and decreased bonuses. We turn now to discuss ghost 
accounts, account therapy and joki accounts as everyday resistance.
Ghost Accounts 
-
cation as akun tuyul, a term that translates as ‘ghost accounts’ and is 
). Such 
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but links are circulated amongst drivers through various channels, in-
cluding social media platforms like Telegram and Facebook. One of the 
researchers, Mustika, joined an open Telegram group called ‘Gonas’ 
(an abbreviation of Gojek Nasional) that has more than 28,000 members. 
Mustika observed numerous activities—particularly the sharing of 
‘ghost account’ applications. Different versions are available, the most 
recent released in 2020 after the outbreak of COVID-19. Technically 
Because the Telegram group is open, company employees could readi-
ly access it, but we did not observe any postings that represented com-
pany interests. Most members shared tips, information on recent com-
pany policies, as well as ghost applications. Some application versions 
required a lot of data, while others did not; some were available free of 
charge, while others followed a paid model. Similarly, there are many 
brands, and drivers who are caught using one can easily download a 
account’, one driver told us. If a driver installs and operates such an 
application on their mobile phone, the company’s system will register 
drivers as working because the GPS tells the system that the taxi is 
operating. In that way, it appears as if drivers are working even when 
they stay at home, and drivers become entitled to bonuses much faster. 
-
tions and prohibits them. In 2019, the company began a campaign with 
the hashtag #HapusTuyul ‘get rid of ghost accounts’.4
statement posted on Gojek’s website, the company’s Vice President of 
Regional Corporate Affairs stated that the drivers who were detected 
by the system downloading fake applications on their mobile phones 
would automatically be asked to uninstall the illegal application. Driv-
ers who failed to do so after seven days would lose their bonuses, and 
after another twenty-one days, the company would permanently sus-
pend the account and end the driver’s contract. Drivers are aware of 
the risk they take by downloading these apps, but such practices en-
it can detect the illicit activities of drivers. We can call it an ‘app war’ 
follows. As it usually takes time for the system to identify a new mod-
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offers them a means of dealing with the company’s algorithms, which 
determine the type of account available to drivers. This form of resis-
tance offers drivers, particularly those with ‘cold’ (anyep) and ‘silent’ 
(gagu) accounts, a means of dealing with the tyranny of algorithm.
Another strategy is manual usage of ‘ghost accounts’ without hav-
ing to rely on hacking the system. Drivers (usually working in teams) 
can ask other drivers, as well as friends and relatives, to order a ride 
in their location. They must make the order using the exact location of 
the driver, otherwise the order may reach another driver in a similar 
location. If their order reaches another driver (i.e. the wrong target), 
the wrongly targeted driver and could potentially result in their ac-
count being downgraded. This practice is despised by those who have 
experienced being wrongly affected. 
 Account Therapy
The second strategy used by drivers is ‘account therapy’ (terapi akun), 
which seeks to transform underperforming accounts (i.e. the cold and 
the silent, anyep and gagu) into gacor accounts, the accounts readily re-
ceiving orders. The notion ‘therapy’ in Indonesian refers to the prac-
tice of bettering one’s ill condition. According to our research, drivers 
believe that poorly performing accounts can be improved: ’You just 
need to be patient’, one interlocutor said. To facilitate this, some driv-
ers—usually those with a long experience, an understanding of how 
orders are received and knowledge of the techniques for upgrading 
accounts—offer ‘therapy services’ in return for payment. One thera-
receiving orders from the system and was ultimately suspended. He 
had done nothing wrong, so he decided to carefully study and educate 
himself in order to improve the account:
in receiving orders]. Some drivers say that it is because their mobile 
phone is old, with limited memory capacity. Others say it is because the 
company has made it like this. I learned that the type of mobile phone 
can indeed be a reason. Activity history can consume a mobile phone’s 
memory, and this makes your mobile phone slow. Others say that it is 
because there are more drivers in the company and the competition is 
getting stiff. Still, others say it is because of the [company] algorithm. 
The fact is, it happened to my account, and I wanted to know why. So I 
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learned what caused it and how to solve it. I slowly accumulated more 
account. Then it spread from mouth to mouth that I can solve problems. I 
Usually, a therapist will operate an ‘ill’ (anyep or gagu) account and 
use it for a week to pick up orders via that account. While doing so, 
-
creasing the phone’s capacity. Once the account has been treated, the 
therapist will return the mobile phone to its owner. The income earned 
while curing the ‘ill’ account is shared between the therapist and ac-
count owner; the therapist is also paid for his or her services (ZR, for 
instance, was paid IDR 250,000 or USD 18). 
obtain and waiting times increased. That year, Gojek recruited more 
drivers in Yogyakarta, thereby increasing competition and reducing 
access to orders. As a consequence, drivers started to search for al-
drivers. There are many reasons why accounts become stagnant: some 
drivers blame company algorithms, while others attribute these issues 
to the mobile phones that they use. If it is due to the algorithm, it is 
necessary to understand these patterns and stay up to date by sharing 
tips with other drivers through social media platforms. Albeit account 
therapy is prohibited by the company, drivers perceive it less nega-
tively and less risky than the use of ghost accounts.
Joki Accounts
The third strategy that Gojek drivers apply involves ‘joki accounts’. By 
regulation, drivers are only allowed one account each. However, we 
have found that some drivers use multiple accounts in order to earn 
extra income. This account is popularly known as akun joki, ‘double 
account’. There are two dimensions of this account: drivers who use 
the users and the sellers and renters of joki accounts claim that this 
is a strategy that increases one’s ability to compete for income. The 
-
ders in order to get bonuses and need more mileage for the tariff per 
kilometre. In the words of driver BA: ‘I would not get enough money 
if I only operated one account; I need two. I have three kids and a 
wife’. Reasonings like this were common among our interlocutors. BA 
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explained that, when waiting for an order, he turned on both accounts. 
When one of the accounts received an order, he turned off the other 
one until the order was completed. Using both accounts, he could earn 
IDR 700,000 (USD 50) per day by working from dawn to 10 PM, almost 
doubling his income. Other drivers operate two accounts at different 
times, using one in the morning and another in the afternoon. As one 
driver explained: ‘I get confused if I operate both of them at the same 
time’.
One of the drivers, Ms. S, operated two accounts. When orders 
were slow because of the COVID-19 pandemic, she began using two 
accounts, each with a different name. When one account received an 
order, she turned off the other, turning it on again after the order was 
completed. This saved her from the long waiting times between the 
orders. Although it was quite tiring for her to operate this way, it al-
lowed her to earn an income comparable to what she earned before the 
pandemic. 
Gojek has changed its bonus policy during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
If drivers operate between 8 AM and 5 PM, they automatically receive 
65,000 (USD 4.7), yet without income from tariffs. If drivers work be-
fore or after this period, they only receive money based on the number 
of kilometres travelled. Ms. S related how this new policy forced her to 
operate a joki account. She said:
Having a double account is my strategy for dealing with the decline in 
orders and income during this pandemic. With these two accounts, I can 
reach two closing points, allowing me to have a double bonus per day 
[IDR 130,000 or USD 9.4]. Otherwise, with only one bonus per day, it 
wouldn’t be enough to feed my family. My husband is only a parking 
man with no stable, daily income. Before the pandemic, I could bring 
home at least IDR 200,000 [USD 14.3] per day [in bonus and tariffs].
To deal with drivers using double accounts, Gojek has implemented a 
new face-recognition policy. Before drivers begin their day, they must 
vermuk, a short version of -
ers have been able to bypass these measures; whenever they receive a 
ready. Another driver told us that he was unable to trace the previous 
re-sell it. ‘I have three accounts I can’t use because of this new policy 
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on face recognition’. Another driver, Ms. W, told us that she operated 
two accounts on the weekend using her husband’s account:
My husband does seasonal labour on the weekend, so I operate his account. 
[Before the pandemic,] I did not seek to get a bonus on that account, just 
to get a small additional income. I told my customers, if the account gets 
orders, it is me, a female driver, who is operating the account, not my 
From the perspective of those who rent out accounts, this is a good 
way to get an extra income. One interlocutor has been a Gojek driver 
for two years. When his friend wanted to become a driver, and there 
were quota limitations to join Gojek, he took the opportunity to rent 
out his own account and developed a business of hiring and selling 
accounts. He bought accounts from other drivers who no longer used 
them or ‘quiet’ accounts with unstable and unpredictable orders. He 
related: 
When orders were not as good as I hoped, around 2019, I rented my 
account—including Gojek’s green jacket and helmet—to my friend 
at the price of IDR 600,000 [USD 43] per month. I didn’t mean to do 
it continuously, but people started knowing that I had rented out my 
account, so I continued to do that. I also bought a quiet account for IDR 
1.6 million [USD 115], used account therapy to make it a good one and 
re-sold it for IDR 3 million [USD 215]. This is what I do now; the money 
I get from re-selling is much higher than my bonus.
Another driver, ZR, told us that he started hiring his account when it 
became slow to pick up orders (anyep account): ‘I had no money to op-
erate, to buy petrol or paying for account therapy. I was not sure what 
to do and I needed money. I started to hire the account to some friends 
who wanted to use it’. 
Renting accounts has become quite popular because many people 
want to be Gojek drivers but they do not have a Yogyakarta-issued 
identity card, which is a requirement for becoming a Gojek driver in 
the city. Furthermore, because Yogyakarta is a student city, many stu-
dents are seeking means of earning money without permanent em-
ployment. For them, renting an account is a quick way to earn money. 
The going rate is IDR 600,000 (USD 43) per month, including the green 
Gojek helmet and jacket. Even more so, as related by BA, Gojek drivers 
can make good money from selling accounts, and this is an alternative 
If I can sell one account in one month, the money I get is equal to 28 days’ 
driving if I manage to reach a closing amount [of 16 points] every day 
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for 28 days. I will get IDR 2.5 million [USD 200], which is equal to what I 
get from re-selling an account, sometimes more. Usually, I buy an anyep 
[bad] account. Before re-selling it, I will do therapy so it becomes gacor 
[a good account]. Nobody wants to buy a bad account, because it is not 
ready to use. 
To sum up, a joki account is a strategy applied by Gojek drivers in deal-
ing with decreased tariff and bonuses. It is everyday resistance prac-
tised both by drivers who sell and rent accounts and also by the drivers 
who use it—all of whom aim to increase their income. The Gojek com-
pany forbids this practice through mechanisms of control, including 
vermuk, ‘face recognition’. By operating double accounts, drivers can 
earn at least one and a half income daily, although it comes with a risk 
and it requires an arrangement with the former account owner.
This article has explored ‘everyday resistance’ among app-based work-
ers in the platform company Gojek in Indonesia. We have argued that 
their strategies are forms of resistance exercised against the company’s 
policies on tariffs, bonuses and algorithm management. The drivers’ 
aim was to make some extra income in order to survive, rather than to 
make ‘big business’. Although the company was aware of this resis-
tance and sanctioned drivers who were caught, there was always lee-
way for drivers to continue what they were doing or to switch to other 
strategies. Having investigated the forms that these strategies took, as 
well as the drivers’ motivations and the effects on their working lives, 
in conclusion, we would like to highlight four points. 
First, in a country that encourages and supports the platform econo-
my across all sectors, the government tolerates these ‘subversive’ prac-
tices: gigwork is considered better than unemployment. Moreover, the 
government lets the platform economy operate within an institution-
al void that, in some ways, facilitates the exploitation of gigworkers. 
They face longer working hours, tighter competition, minimum work-
ers’ rights and various application-based techniques of measuring per-
formance and disciplining drivers.
versions of the company application (‘ghost account’) although drivers 
fully technologised algorithm. Other app-based resistance forms, name-
ly ‘account therapy’ and ‘joki account’ are exercised by following the 
existing algorithm but also manipulating it, thereby transforming driv-
  63
 ‘Ghost Accounts,’ ‘Joki Accounts’ and ‘Account Therapy’
ers’ accounts from anyep (few orders) to gacor (many orders). Although 
the Gojek company attempted to counteract these strategies by prohibit-
ing alternative apps and requiring face recognition, drivers found ways 
around it and still operate these strategies today. 
-
-
ers exercised the strategies in attempts to increase their income in 
order to survive (‘act of pragmatism’) and to work the system (‘act 
of resistance’). However, while we are inspired by Scotts’s concept of 
everyday resistance, his framework seems somewhat insensitive to 
pragmatic considerations, including the money-making, and the over-
lap between acts of resisting, acts of surviving (pragmatism) and acts 
of free-riding (opportunism). Indeed, the pragmatism of powerless 
groups is intended to ensure survival, and opportunism is a means of 
increasing revenue streams. Their strategies fan out over a spectrum 
with blurred boundaries.
Finally, our study demonstrates that although the drivers apply 
these strategies individually, they collectively share their knowledge 
and experience with these strategies. Still, these strategies have not 
been able to transform driver-company relationships, hierarchies, 
company control, the exploitation of drivers and so forth in any signif-
icant way. Yet, they make a difference to the drivers, helping them to 
‘navigate’ the system of exploitation even if only by providing a little 
more money to survive. 
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